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THE MORGAN CASE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
KENNETH C. SEARS
The University of Chicago Law School

There will be no effort to discuss various aspects of
administrative procedure. Attention will be confined to
two propositions which were discussed in the Morgan
opinions.
The first task is to state as accurately as possible the
facts that appeared in the Morgan opinions. Then it
seems desirable to add such facts as have appeared in discussions of the opinions. Particular reference will be
made to the communications by Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry A. Wallace, and Frederick Wood, who was one
of the lawyers appearing in the Morgan case. After the
facts have been presented, an effort will be made to state
the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States.
After acquiring this background, other decisions, dealing
with the same or similar questions will be discussed.
The first Morgan opinion,' delivered in 1936, was almost certain to be unsatisfactory if the real facts were
ever to be disclosed to the public. The case arose as a suit
to restrain an order of the Secretary of Agriculture from
fixing maximum rates. Paragraph 4 of the bill of complaint charged that the Secretary had denied a "full"
hearing as required by statute, in that he had (a) denied
a request for a separate hearing for the petitioner who
was one of fifty affected by the order; (b) had denied the
request for a tentative report by the examiner; (c) had
improperly delegated to Dunlap and Tugwell the authority solely vested in the Secretary; and (d) had signed the
order although he had not (1) personally heard or read
any of the evidence, (2) had not heard or considered the
Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906, 80 L. ed. 1288 (1936).
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oral arguments and (3) had not read or considered the
briefs submitted by the petitioner. On the contrary it was
asserted that the Secretary's sole information of the proceedings was derived from consultation ex parte with the
employees of the Department of Agriculture.
This paragraph 4 of the bill of complaint was "struck
out" by the District Court. Thus the controversy came
before the Supreme Court on the pleadings and my ob-.
servation has been that this is a very poor way of realistically considering the facts. It will suffice at the
present time to say no more than that the Supreme Court
ruled that the District Court erred in its order striking
out paragraph 4. It ordered the defendants to answer the
allegations and also ordered that the lower court determine whether the plaintiffs had had a proper hearing.
The case was returned to the District Court of three
judges and they proceeded to determine whether the
plaintiffs had had a "full" hearing. District Judge Otis,
speaking for himself and District Judge Reeves stated,
as follows:2
... Evidence has been heard. Not only has it not been proved
that the Secretary did not read any of the evidence, nor hear
the oral arguments, nor read and consider the briefs which plaintiffs submitted, but exactly the opposite has been proved. The
Secretary did read parts of the transcript of the testimony; he
did hear (not with his ears but by reading) the oral arguments,
he did read and consider the briefs submitted by plaintiffs. These
things have been proved unless indeed we shall reject the testimony of the Secretary of Agriculture as incredible. That alternative, absent a much stronger showing than is here, is not to
be thought of in connection with the testimony of an honorable
and distinguished head-of a great executive department of the
Federal government.
The Supreme Court has not said that it was the duty of the
Secretary of Agriculture to hear or read all the evidence and, in
addition thereto, to hear the oral arguments and to read and consider briefs. If the Supreme Court had said that it would have
meant that the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 181
et seq. cannot be administered. It is entirely impracticable to
administer it if it imposes such a duty on the Secretary person2
Morgan v. U. S., 23 F. Supp. 380 (1937).
District Court, see 8 F. Supp. 766 (1934).

For the first opinion in the
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ally. Consider that in this very case the transcript of the oral
testimony fills 13,000 pages. The exhibits, several hundred, fill
more than 1,000 pages. A narrative statement of just a part of
the oral testimony fills 500 printed pages. Learned counsel for
plaintiffs assert indeed that they do not mean to contend that
the Secretary personally must have read all of this mass of testimony. Such a contention could not be maintained. Let it be
frankly stated now that the judges of this court, whose duty it
was to consider the case de novo (since it involved constitutional
issues), did not read all this testimony. We think, moreover,
that it may be predicted with some assurance that all this testimony will not be read by the Justices of the Supreme Court
when, as they must, they consider the cases on the merits.

Circuit Judge Van Valkenburgh, dissenting, stated that
the Secretary of Agriculture did not give the matter "the

personal consideration which it is his duty" to give. In
other words, the Secretary's "examinations . . . were casual and perfunctory in the extreme."
After the case was returned to the Supreme Court, Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes wrote the second opinion and he
stated the facts, as follows:'
In the record now before us the controlling facts stand out
clearly. The original administrative proceeding was begun on
April 7, 1930, when the Secretary of Agriculture issued an
order of inquiry and notice of hearing with respect to the reasonableness of the charges of appellants for stockyards services at
Kansas City. The taking of evidence before an examiner of the
Department was begun on December 3, 1930, and continued
until February 10, 1931. The Government and appellants were
represented by counsel and voluminous testimony and exhibits
were introduced. In March, 1931, oral argument was had before
the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and appellants submitted a
brief. On May 18, 1932, the Secretary issued his findings and
an order prescribing maximum rates. In view of changed economic conditions, the Secretary vacated that order and granted
a rehearing. That was begun on October 6, 1932, and the taking of evidence was concluded on November 16, 1932. The
evidence received at the first hearing was re-submitted and this
was supplemented by additional testimony and exhibits. On
March 24, 1933, oral argument was had before Rexford G.
Tugwell as Acting Secretary.
It appears that there were about 10,000 pages of transcript
of oral evidence and over 1,000 pages of statistical exhibits. The
oral argument was general and sketchy. Appellants submitted
the brief which they had presented after the first administrative
3 Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938).
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hearing and a supplemental brief dealing with the evidence introduced upon the rehearing. No brief was at any time supplied by the Government. Apart from what was said on its
behalf in the oral argument, the Government formulated no
issues and furnished appellants no statement or summary of its
contentions and no proposed findings. Appellants' request that
the examiner prepare a tentative report, to be submitted as a
basis for exceptions and argument, was refused.
Findings were prepared in the Bureau of Animal Industry,
Department of Agriculture, whose representatives had conducted
the proceedings for the government, and were submitted to the
Secretary who signed them, with a few changes in the rates,
when his order was made on June 14, 1933. These findings, 180
in number, were elaborate. They dealt with the practices and
facilities at the Kansas City livestock market, the character of
appellants' business and services, their rates and the volume of
their transactions, their gross revenues, their methods in getting and maintaining business, their joint activities, the economic
changes since the year 1929, the principles which governed the
determination of reasonable commission rates, the classification
of cost items, the reasonable unit costs plus a reasonable amount
of profits to be covered into reasonable commission rates, the
reasonable amounts to be included for salesmanship, yarding
salaries and expenses, office salaries and expenses, business getting and maintaining expenses, administrative and general expenses, insurance, interest on capital, and profits, together with
summary and the establishment of the rate structure. Upon the
basis of the reasonable costs as thus determined, the Secretary
found that appellants' schedules of rates were unreasonable and
unjustly discriminatory and fixed the maximum schedules of the
just and reasonable rates thereafter to be charged.
No opportunitj Was afforded to appellants for the examination of the findings thus prepared in the Bureau of Animal Industry until they were served with the order. Appellants sought
a rehearing by the Secretary but their application was denied on
July 6, 1933, and these suits followed.
The part taken by the Secretary himself in the departmental
proceedings is shown by his full and candid testimony. The
evidence had been received before he took office. He did not
hear the oral argument. The bulky record was placed upon his
desk and he dipped into it from time to time to get its drift.
He decided that probably the essence of the evidence was contained in appellants' briefs. These, together with the transcript
of the oral argument, he took home with him and read. He had
several conferences with the Solicitor of the Department and
with the officials in the Bureau of Animal Industry and discussed the proposed findings. He testified that he considered
the evidence before signing the order. The substance of his
action is stated in his answer to the question whether the order
represented his independent conclusion, as follows:
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"My answer to the question would be that that very definitely
was my independent conclusion as based on the findings of the
men in the Bureau of Animal Industry. I would say, I will try
to put it as accurately as possible, that it represented my own
independent reactions to the findings of the men in the Bureau
of Animal Industry."

There is no great difference in the facts as stated by the
District Court and by the Chief Justice. Nevertheless,
it is interesting to observe that Judge Otis for the District
Court stated that Secretary Wallace "read parts of the
transcript of the testimony" whereas the Chief Justice
stated that the Secretary "dipped into it from time to time
to get its drift." This is an example of the difficulty one
has in securing an accurate picture of the true factual
situation even when he is relying upon carefully phrased
court opinions. And this is my excuse for setting forth
both statements of the facts, which, after all, are of fundamental importance.
After the second opinion in the Morgan case was delivered, Secretary Wallace decided to appeal to the "bar
of public opinion." Accordingly, he wrote a long letter
to the New York Times which was printed Sunday, May
8, 1938. This letter was answered by Frederick H. Wood
in an equally long letter which appeared in the New
York Times Sunday, May 15, 1938. No attention will
be devoted to the effort of the Secretary to acquit his
administration and to blame the lack of proper procedure
upon the preceding administration, nor to the effort of
Mr. Wood to refute this allegation and to blame Secretary Wallace for the asserted procedural irregularity.
For the present, at least, we are interested only in additional facts disclosed by the two writers. From this point
of view the following statements by Secretary Wallace
are of interest. In 1928 the administration of the Packers
and Stockyards Act had been divided. The legal phase
of the work "composed of the active prosecutors, went to
the Solicitor's office; the administrative and investigational section went to the Bureau of Animal Industry."
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This was by way of partial answer to the statement in
the second Morgan opinion implying that the Secretary
had accepted and made as his own, findings of fact which
had been prepared "by the active prosecutors for the
Government, after an ex parte discussion with them and
without according any reasonable opportunity to the respondents in the proceeding to know the claims thus
presented and to contest them."
The Secretary stated further that the Solicitor's office
prosecuted the case; but that the Bureau of Animal Industry digested the evidence. Then "I conferred separately and collectively with both groups. Their opinions
did not agree. I arrived at an independent opinion of
my own." As a result of his own opinion he raised certain
rates. The Secretary made the point that the men in the
Bureau "were not the active prosecutors" but, as stated,
they were the ones who digested the evidence.
The argument in the proceedings, after it had been reopened by Secretary Hyde, occurred on March 24 just
twenty days after President Franklin Roosevelt had been
inaugurated the first time. Previous to this argument
before Assistant Secretary Tugwell the commission men
had not been given the right to look at the proposed
order, if there was one at that time.
Mr. Wood in his letter stated that, at the conclusion of
the argument before Secretary Tugwell, the commission
men requested that a tentative report be served on them
in order that they might be apprised of the proposed findings and have an opportunity to take exception thereto.
This request was denied. Then to quote from Mr. Wood's
letter: "Thereafter, however, a tentative report was prepared by the attorney for the department who had prosecuted the case against the commission men in the proceedings within the department, by a subordinate attorney
who assisted the former in such prosecution, and by an
economist in the department who was one of the chief
witnesses for the department in the case. The tentative
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report was then submitted to the Secretary, who accepted
the findings of fact prepared by the gentlemen named,
without change." This statement by Mr. Wood appears
to justify substantially the statement by the court concerning the active prosecutors for the Government. 4
On May 21, 1938, J. H. Mohler, Chief of the Bureau
of Animal Industry, wrote to the New York Times defending Secretary Wallace against the charges made by
Mr. Wood. He denied that the Secretary had accepted
the findings of the active prosecutors for the government.
He stated, "That the findings were the Secretary's own,
arrived at after looking over the statistical exhibits and
transcript of oral argument and after conferring with the
experts in the Bureau of Animal Industry who had summarized the evidence." As will be observed, this statement does not include what the Secretary had admitted
about conferring with the men in the Solicitor's office.
Such are the facts as I have been able to glean them
from the several sources. To repeat, the first opinion in
the Morgan case was based upon the pleadings and,
therefore, is an opinion that is not based upon a realistic
view of facts. It also seems necessary to say that the
second opinion is not entirely satisfactory in this respect.
By this there is meant no criticism of the Supreme Court.
But it is one case to show that in our legal procedure we
sometimes deal with unreal situations.
It also seems fair to state that it is rather unfortunate
that the Supreme Court apparently decided to use the
Morgan case as an opportunity for setting forth some
general standards to which administrative tribunals, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, must adhere. To begin
4 From conversations I have had with John B. Gage of Kansas City, one of
the attorneys for Morgan, I have concluded that the main procedural complaint
of his clients is that the Department of Agriculture operated in this particular
case, at least, in a manner that compelled the conclusion that in reality the
prosecutor and judge functions were not separated. Therefore, there was, in
their opinion, no adequate consideration of the question of confiscatory rates by
the Department, acting through its Secretary, free from preconceived notions
and desires. In other words there was a lack of judicial objectivity.
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with, it is doubtful whether such tribunals are sufficiently
alike to make general utterances as to procedural regularity of much value. In any event looking at the facts
as a whole, it is impossible for me to believe that the
Kansas City commission men were mistreated if they are
to be judged by procedural standards frequently applied.
On the contrary it seems that the Secretary of Agriculture
proceeded fairly and honestly. This means that I know
of no general rule that in administrative proceedings,
there must be a formal and careful separation of the judge
and prosecutor. The Secretary may have been wrong in
the rates he set. It is a pity that there has been no decision of this question. Instead of that, we have what has
too much the appearance of shadow boxing without really
getting to the controversy over the merits. One must keep
in mind that here was a controversy that started in 1930.
An order setting rates was issued in 1932. Due to the
economic situation, the rates then set were apparently
thought to be too high and the proceeding was re-opened.
More evidence was taken. A supplemental brief was filed.
Another argument was had. In view of all of this, how
can any one have any reasonable doubt that the commission men well knew the points in controversy? How can
one be sympathetic with the Supreme Court when it said,
after all of this had occurred, that the commission men
were not sufficiently advised of the government's complaint? One is reminded of persons standing before the
bar accused of crime in the form of the old-time verbose
indictments, but complaining, nevertheless, and often successfully, that they had not been informed of the crimes
of which they had been accused.
I have been impressed with a comment made by Secretary Wallace in his letter in the New York Times that
the purpose of the court apparently was to flash a warning
to quasi-judicial agencies that their procedure would have
to be reformed and applied more carefully. Last Monday, the Supreme Court set the Morgan case for re-
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argument. This time, after nearly nine years the court
may be concerned lest the Secretary of Agriculture breaks
forth with a statement similar to the "greatest legalized
steal in history." Over $500,000 is in the "bag."
Regardless of the complete story of the facts one must
bow to the authority of the Supreme Court in the first
two Morgan opinions. I shall attempt to state the decisions, although I am conscious that in all probability
others would state them differently. The first Morgan
opinion seems to hold merely that the District Court
committed error in striking out paragraph 4 of the bill
of complaint. As a justification for this holding the Court
set forth the following conclusions: (a) the Secretary of
Agriculture had a personal responsibility in making the
rate order and this responsibility was not discharged
when he decided the controversy, without hearing the
argument, or reading the evidence or brief, and merely
upon consultation with departmental employees; (b) the
submission of an examiner's report to the parties prior
to the argument before the Secretary was good practice,
but nevertheless, not essential to the validity of the hearing. I am omitting discussion of the point of the Secretary's lack of authority to delegate his duty to the Acting
Secretary.
The decision on the second appeal of the Morgan case
was that the hearing was fatally defective because the
government's claims were not presented in a way that
the plaintiffs could know and meet them. In support of
this the Court stated that there was "no specific complaint." There was no examiner's report and there was
no government brief.
In the third Morgan opinion,5 a per curiam opinion
that was prompted by a motion for rehearing by the
Solicitor General, we have in the main a refutation by
the Supreme Court of a complaint that the second Mor5 Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 999, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938).
subsequent istory, see Morgan v. U. S., 24 F. Supp. 214 (1938).

For
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gan opinion was inconsistent with a part of the first
Morgan opinion. This was denied by the Court with some
heat. And it was stated that, "Our decision was not
rested upon the absence of an examiner's report." This
seems to be literally true because the second opinion did
not limit itself to the absence of an examiner's report.
The procedural objection was stated more broadly, to wit:
that the plaintiffs had not had a reasonable opportunity
to know the claims of the government and to meet them.
Since, however, an examiner's report is a desirable, if not
the most desirable, method of disclosing the government's
claims based on the facts, it seems to me that the Supreme
Court made a serious error in stating in. its first opinion
that an examiner's report was not essential to the validity
of the hearing, if it contemplated that later it would deliver such an opinion as the second opinion proved to be.
If in the meantime, the Court had changed its mind, it
would have been much more satisfactory to have so stated.
The rule of law becomes still more confused if one
attempts to reconcile these three opinions with the opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.6
which was rendered on May 16, 1938, a very short time
before the per curiam or third Morgan opinion. In the
Mackay case complaint was made that there was no examiner's report. But the Court denied the validity of the
argument in view of the fact that the record disclosed
that the complainant understood the issue and had had a
full hearing and thus an opportunity to justify its action.
I have been unable to draw any satisfactory distinction
between the Mackay and Morgan cases. It seems that
the issue in the Morgan case was clear, viz., whether the
rate order would afford the commission men a fair return
for the services rendered and the property used. I do not
understand how there could have been any confusion.
Presumably, an examiner's report would have been helpful in getting the issue down to the finer details of the
6

304 U. S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. ed. 1381 (1938).
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broad problem, but probably this general remark could
be made of any case.
Of more importance, probably, is the question, what
has been the reception of the Morgan opinions and what
appears to be the prospect for a change of procedure with
respect to administrative agencies performing quasijudicial functions.
The law reviews' generally have been critical. A look
at the citator shows one opinion professing to follow but
several opinions which "distinguished" the Morgan opinions. This may be of considerable significance.
As far as the Secretary of Agriculture in the administration of the Packers and Stockyard Act is concerned,
Secretary Wallace derived considerable satisfaction in
writing that, long before the second Morgan opinion was
rendered, procedure in his department had been changed
so that an examiner's report, before the argument was
heard, was regarded as a matter of right and its issuance
apparently has become a routine matter.
Also it appears that the N.L.R.B., the most harshly
criticized of the administrative agencies, quickly resolved
to make it a general rather than a variable custom to have
the trial examiner issue a report which would afford a
basis for argument before the Board. One may guess that
there will be other administrative agencies which will
follow this pattern. Thus, even though the Morgan opinions have been the subject of considerable criticism, they
seem to be having some effect in changing administrative
procedure. This seems to me to be all to the good. Regardless of whether examiners' reports are necessary, they
seem to be at least desirable from the point of view of
reconciling business interests to administrative procedure.
After all it is almost as important to give the appearance
7 (1939)

52 HARV. L. REV. 509; (1938) 14 IND. L. J. 164; (1936) 5 GEO.
(1938) 7 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 110; (1936) 36 COL. L.

WASH. L. REv. 119;

REv. 1156.
See also, (1938) 33 ILL L. REv. 227.
The following comment is favorable to the decisions in the Morgan Case.
(1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 351.

MORGAN CASE-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

of rendering justice as it is actually to render justice.
The deep suspicion on the part of many, if not most,
practicing lawyers and business men as to the fairness of
many administrative tribunals is a matter of great regret
and should be corrected wherever possible. The only
apparent limitation upon this theory involves consideration for a prompt disposition of controversies. It will be
unfortunate if courts compel elaboration of administrative procedure to the extent that administrative agencies
are as slow as the courts themselves in rendering justice.
In U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. of California,' there is
some discussion of the first Morgan opinion, but the court
was not aware of the real facts. The opinion was distinguished and held not applicable to procedure before the
Secretary of Interior where he acts as an appellate tribunal. He is justified, holds the District Court, in having
assistants digest the facts and prepare the opinion for him
to sign. Apparently all the Secretary has to do is listen
to the argument and take the responsibility for the opinion and decision. The District Court, by way of distinction, stated that the first Morgan case concerned a
proceeding before the Secretary of Agriculture involving
original jurisdiction rather than appellate jurisdiction.
Two interesting cases involving the N.L.R.B., both of
which discuss the Morgan opinions, are N.L.R.B. v. Biles
Coleman Lumber Co! and N.L.R.B. v. Cherry Cotton
0 In the first case it was held that it was no defense
Mills."
for a petition to the Board to assert that the Board arrived
at its order without reading all of the testimony. This,
said the court, was not required in order to render due
process. Nor was it an answer to say that the Board had
not read a "sufficient" portion of the testimony. This,
said the court, was an allegation of a conclusion of law.
More important, the court held that it was no answer to
8 20 F. Supp. 427, 448 (1937).

998 F. (2d) 16 (1938).
1098 F. (2d) 444 (1938) ; (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1279; (1939) 8 FoIWHAM
L. REv. 115.
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a petition to enforce the Board's order that its findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and order were never in advance of approval by the Board submitted to the defendant so that it could object to them. The court arrived at
this conclusion because it was admitted: (a) that the
charges against the defendant had definitely advised the
defendant of the matters complained of; (b) that an
argument was had by the defendant before the trial examiner upon the evidence and at the same time the Board
attorney presented the Board's contention; (c) that the
defendant prepared a brief for the Board; and (d) that
defendant was allowed full opportunity to argue its case.
The admission that all of this occurred, in the opinion of
a Circuit Court of Appeals, justified a holding that the
lumber company had received a fair hearing and had
thus been accorded procedural due process.
In the cotton mills case it was asserted as a defense to
the petition for the enforcement of the Board's order that
(a) no copy of the examiner's report, if any, was furnished to the defendant; (b) that counsel for the Board
made no argument before the Board and, if a brief was
filed by the Board's counsel, defendant had received no
copy; (c) that no proposed findings of fact were submitted to the defendant before the final order was issued, and
(d) that the Board had at no time read or considered the
evidence, but that the evidence had been considered only
by "hirelings" of the Board. In view of these allegations
the court decided that under the Morgan opinions interrogations to the Board should be issued in order to obtain
the facts. The court postponed the question as to whether
a commission should issue to take the depositions of the
members of the Board, but the court asserted that it was
the duty of the Board to find the facts on the disputed
issues. It also stated that if only one party to the controversy makes an argument or if neither makes an argument, the responsibility of the Board is broader.
The lumber company and the cotton mills cases do not
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appear to contradict each other, but they may be very
narrowly on opposite sides of the line that may be
"pricked out" by the process that is now unfolding. Both
are cases on the pleadings, unfortunately, but the really
significant point in the cotton mills case seems to be the
allegation that the Board decided the case without knowledge of the facts. This seems to be a repudiation in a
broad way of the English Arlidge case. But it has been
pointed out elsewhere" that the Supreme Court in the
first Morgan opinion apparently repudiated that opinion
even though ostensibly it stated that it was a horse of
another color.
Finally, it should be stated that in the Consolidated
Edison case,' 2 a Circuit Court of Appeals held that where
there was a transfer of the proceeding from the trial
examiner to the N.L.R.B. before an intermediate report
was prepared, there was no lack of due process even
though there was no oral argument before the Board.
Said the court, after disapproving of the procedure:
"Nor do we think the Board is bound to hear oral argument if it prefers to take a brief." It is doubtful whether
this decision will carry far in view of the way the Supreme Court disposed of the same issue."3
11 (1938) 47

YALE L. J. 647, 663.
F. (2d) 390, 394 (1938).
'1 Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.. 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (U. S. 1938). The
rules of the Board did not dispense with the necessity, after a transfer of the
case to the Board, "of a suitable request by the petitioners for such additional
hearing as they desired. It does not appear that such request was made."
12 95

